miércoles, 28 de noviembre de 2012
Wizards Get First Win After 0-12 Start
Earlier today, I put up a poll question asking readers to predict how long the Washington Wizards' season-opening losing streak in the National Basketball Association would continue. It didn't take long for the poll to become moot (and be removed), as the Wizards went and won their first game hours later. With tonight's 84-82 win over the Portland Trail Blazers, the DC squad is now 1-12.
miércoles, 21 de noviembre de 2012
Grinnell College's Jack Taylor Scores a Whopping 138 Points in a Single Game!
A basketball player scoring 100 points in a single game, as Wilt Chamberlain did in the NBA 50 years ago and a small number of college players have done as well, is a mind-boggling occurrence. Last night, however, Jack Taylor of Iowa's Grinnell College took things to a new level, scoring an unfathomable 138 points in an NCAA Division III (small-school) win over Faith Baptist Bible, 179-104.
Now, Grinnell's style of play is conducive to the launching of lots of shots. A year ago, another Grinnell player scored 89 in a game. But Taylor scored nearly 50 points more than that 89! According to this 2009 profile of the team's offensive approach:
Grinnell coach David Arseneault employs a scheme known only as “The System.” Sometimes referred to as the anti-Princeton offense, “The System” emphasizes a torrid pace of play where offensive possesions last about 5 seconds and typically end with a three-pointer.
The Grinnell defense is a chaotic, full-court trap that either forces an immediate turnover or degenerates into [an offensive advantage for the other team].
It’s so chaotic, Arseneault has to use platoons, substituting all five players every 45 seconds to keep legs fresh.
Taylor's shooting statistics from last night break down as follows: 25-of-37 on two-point attempts; 27-of-71 on three-point attempts; and 7-of-10 on free throws. He played 36 minutes.
From a hot-hand perspective, the question is whether Taylor actually "got hot" or whether his gigantic point total resulted simply from a mediocre shooting percentage on a huge number of shots (108). I would say it's some of both.
Let's focus on Taylor's three-point attempts, as the distance of the shots is held relatively constant and long-distance shots get the crowd excited. Based on the box score and play-by-play sheet from the game, here are his shooting sequences behind the arc in the first and second half (H = hit, M = miss; shots are grouped into sets of five to simplify viewing):
1st half (9-of-32)
MMMMM HMMMM HMMHM MHHMM MHHHM MHMMM MM
2nd half (18-of-39)
HMMMH HMMMH MHMMM HMHHM MMMMM MHMMH HMHHH HHHH
As shown, for most of the game, Taylor was not hitting more than one or two straight. Any long streaks were of misses. However, to close the game, Taylor hit his last seven three-pointers in a row.
Using this online calculator, I conducted a runs test to detect possible streakiness in Taylor's second-half shooting (I didn't think there would be any in the first half). Each consecutive sequence of hits or misses is considered a "run." The hit to open the second half is one run. The stretch of three straight misses is a second run. The following two straight hits form a third run, etc. Streakiness is characterized by few runs (i.e., staying in long "grooves" of hitting or missing), as compared to what could be generated at random. Here is a screen capture of the results (on which you may click to enlarge; 1 = hit, 0 = miss):
There were 17 runs, which are too many in this context for there to be streakiness. The associated probability (p) level tells us further that there is a 13% chance that a random process (e.g., flipping a coin and looking for runs of heads and tails) could have generated Taylor's second-half sequence of hits and misses from three-point land. Under statistical convention, we would need this probability to be 5% or less (i.e., p < .05).
One thing that I found really interesting about Taylor's final burst of seven straight successful three-pointers is the quickness of the barrage. Below is a screen capture of the play-by-play sheet, to which I've added red arrows to identify Taylor's made threes.
If you click on the graphic, you'll see that Taylor's seven hits all occurred within roughly two minutes of game time (from 3:54 remaining to 1:57). Several times, either a Grinnell steal or a Faith Baptist Bible layup was followed within 3 to 10 seconds later by a Taylor trey.
In my book, I discuss a late-game barrage by Iowa's Justin Johnson, who made six three-pointers in the final 1:56 against Indiana in 2008 to bring his team within two points.
The fact that Grinnell's game against FBB was not close raises another issue, namely the propriety of continuing to launch three-pointers in the closing minutes when leading by roughly 60 points. The desire to let Taylor finish his performance for the ages is understandable. One could argue, however, that it might have been better for Grinnell to start dribbling out the clock once Taylor had surpassed the previous college record of 116 points.
Now, Grinnell's style of play is conducive to the launching of lots of shots. A year ago, another Grinnell player scored 89 in a game. But Taylor scored nearly 50 points more than that 89! According to this 2009 profile of the team's offensive approach:
Grinnell coach David Arseneault employs a scheme known only as “The System.” Sometimes referred to as the anti-Princeton offense, “The System” emphasizes a torrid pace of play where offensive possesions last about 5 seconds and typically end with a three-pointer.
The Grinnell defense is a chaotic, full-court trap that either forces an immediate turnover or degenerates into [an offensive advantage for the other team].
It’s so chaotic, Arseneault has to use platoons, substituting all five players every 45 seconds to keep legs fresh.
Taylor's shooting statistics from last night break down as follows: 25-of-37 on two-point attempts; 27-of-71 on three-point attempts; and 7-of-10 on free throws. He played 36 minutes.
From a hot-hand perspective, the question is whether Taylor actually "got hot" or whether his gigantic point total resulted simply from a mediocre shooting percentage on a huge number of shots (108). I would say it's some of both.
Let's focus on Taylor's three-point attempts, as the distance of the shots is held relatively constant and long-distance shots get the crowd excited. Based on the box score and play-by-play sheet from the game, here are his shooting sequences behind the arc in the first and second half (H = hit, M = miss; shots are grouped into sets of five to simplify viewing):
1st half (9-of-32)
MMMMM HMMMM HMMHM MHHMM MHHHM MHMMM MM
2nd half (18-of-39)
HMMMH HMMMH MHMMM HMHHM MMMMM MHMMH HMHHH HHHH
As shown, for most of the game, Taylor was not hitting more than one or two straight. Any long streaks were of misses. However, to close the game, Taylor hit his last seven three-pointers in a row.
Using this online calculator, I conducted a runs test to detect possible streakiness in Taylor's second-half shooting (I didn't think there would be any in the first half). Each consecutive sequence of hits or misses is considered a "run." The hit to open the second half is one run. The stretch of three straight misses is a second run. The following two straight hits form a third run, etc. Streakiness is characterized by few runs (i.e., staying in long "grooves" of hitting or missing), as compared to what could be generated at random. Here is a screen capture of the results (on which you may click to enlarge; 1 = hit, 0 = miss):
There were 17 runs, which are too many in this context for there to be streakiness. The associated probability (p) level tells us further that there is a 13% chance that a random process (e.g., flipping a coin and looking for runs of heads and tails) could have generated Taylor's second-half sequence of hits and misses from three-point land. Under statistical convention, we would need this probability to be 5% or less (i.e., p < .05).
One thing that I found really interesting about Taylor's final burst of seven straight successful three-pointers is the quickness of the barrage. Below is a screen capture of the play-by-play sheet, to which I've added red arrows to identify Taylor's made threes.
If you click on the graphic, you'll see that Taylor's seven hits all occurred within roughly two minutes of game time (from 3:54 remaining to 1:57). Several times, either a Grinnell steal or a Faith Baptist Bible layup was followed within 3 to 10 seconds later by a Taylor trey.
In my book, I discuss a late-game barrage by Iowa's Justin Johnson, who made six three-pointers in the final 1:56 against Indiana in 2008 to bring his team within two points.
The fact that Grinnell's game against FBB was not close raises another issue, namely the propriety of continuing to launch three-pointers in the closing minutes when leading by roughly 60 points. The desire to let Taylor finish his performance for the ages is understandable. One could argue, however, that it might have been better for Grinnell to start dribbling out the clock once Taylor had surpassed the previous college record of 116 points.
sábado, 20 de octubre de 2012
The "Imperfect Casino" Analogy to Hot Hand Perceptions: A Guest Contribution by Mark Lloyd
Mark Lloyd of Seattle, Washington recently e-mailed me the following essay of his. I invited him to let me post it here on the blog as a guest contribution, and he agreed. Here it is, with light editing.
A couple of years ago I wrote a computer program simulating a basketball team with players' shooting percentages varying on different days according to distributions with a mean of 50 percent, but with different variances. I then tested the strategy of giving the ball to players who made two shots in a row compared to giving the ball to players randomly. In the long term giving the ball to the hot hand was a winning strategy.
Thinking about this recently I came up with an analogy that makes clear the difference between the casino and hot hand theory and the mistakes many statisticians make assuming that believing in the hot hand is just the same as the gambler's fallacy of believing that one should bet on a roulette wheel that has shown a streak of results.
Let’s say we have an imperfect casino with five roulette tables that, if in perfect condition, select red and black 50 percent of the time. The casino’s roulette tables however are in disrepair, and further, the casino sits above a subway line that occasionally shakes the tables, causing them to vary their percentage of hitting black or red from 40-60 to 60-40 with a mean of 50-50. There is no way to observe the condition of the roulette wheel except to observe the results of wagering on the tables.
With most visitors not having the time to do a long-term statistical analysis of the tables, is wagering on a table that has hit red or black twice in a row a better strategy than randomly betting on any color on any table? Clearly yes: A table that is hitting red 60 percent of the time will hit red twice in a row 36 percent of the time, while a table hitting 40 percent will only hit two in a row 16 percent of the time. With the tables at some range between 40-60 and 60-40, this two-in-a-row percentage will vary between 16 and 36 percent. More often imperfect tables that hit two in a row will have a higher winning percentage.
If every day you walk in to the casino, wait for a table to hit a color twice in a row, then bet on that table and color, over time you will do better than if you randomly bet on a random table and color.
A real-life non-statistician watching for a hot hand in a basketball game may well be thinking something like: “He hit two in a row, I think he is shooting better than average today.” The non-statistician has also made a correct observation that at least in the case of basketball, daily shooting percentages vary more than one would expect randomly. In the course of a game there is limited information to measure this variance, so looking for shooting streaks is an imperfect way to find players who have a higher underlying skill that day. The statistician's job is to operationalize that observation.
What statisticians will observe is that in the short term on any given day, if you measure any roulette table in the imperfect casino, the percentage of hitting a color after hitting the same color twice in a row will not be different than after any other sequence (unless a subway train passes underneath). This is the same as observing a basketball player on a given day (or a given hour depending on that shooter's pattern of consistency). This observation misleads the statistician into believing the hot hand is no different than a casino winning streak in a perfect casino, but the statistician is asking a different question than the non-statistician.
The statistician should be asking how the percentage of streaks varies from day to day; this will more closely operationalize what the non-statistician is observing and make the statistician wealthier as well.
The world of sports is a world of imperfect casinos. This confounds statisticians.
A couple of years ago I wrote a computer program simulating a basketball team with players' shooting percentages varying on different days according to distributions with a mean of 50 percent, but with different variances. I then tested the strategy of giving the ball to players who made two shots in a row compared to giving the ball to players randomly. In the long term giving the ball to the hot hand was a winning strategy.
Thinking about this recently I came up with an analogy that makes clear the difference between the casino and hot hand theory and the mistakes many statisticians make assuming that believing in the hot hand is just the same as the gambler's fallacy of believing that one should bet on a roulette wheel that has shown a streak of results.
Let’s say we have an imperfect casino with five roulette tables that, if in perfect condition, select red and black 50 percent of the time. The casino’s roulette tables however are in disrepair, and further, the casino sits above a subway line that occasionally shakes the tables, causing them to vary their percentage of hitting black or red from 40-60 to 60-40 with a mean of 50-50. There is no way to observe the condition of the roulette wheel except to observe the results of wagering on the tables.
With most visitors not having the time to do a long-term statistical analysis of the tables, is wagering on a table that has hit red or black twice in a row a better strategy than randomly betting on any color on any table? Clearly yes: A table that is hitting red 60 percent of the time will hit red twice in a row 36 percent of the time, while a table hitting 40 percent will only hit two in a row 16 percent of the time. With the tables at some range between 40-60 and 60-40, this two-in-a-row percentage will vary between 16 and 36 percent. More often imperfect tables that hit two in a row will have a higher winning percentage.
If every day you walk in to the casino, wait for a table to hit a color twice in a row, then bet on that table and color, over time you will do better than if you randomly bet on a random table and color.
A real-life non-statistician watching for a hot hand in a basketball game may well be thinking something like: “He hit two in a row, I think he is shooting better than average today.” The non-statistician has also made a correct observation that at least in the case of basketball, daily shooting percentages vary more than one would expect randomly. In the course of a game there is limited information to measure this variance, so looking for shooting streaks is an imperfect way to find players who have a higher underlying skill that day. The statistician's job is to operationalize that observation.
What statisticians will observe is that in the short term on any given day, if you measure any roulette table in the imperfect casino, the percentage of hitting a color after hitting the same color twice in a row will not be different than after any other sequence (unless a subway train passes underneath). This is the same as observing a basketball player on a given day (or a given hour depending on that shooter's pattern of consistency). This observation misleads the statistician into believing the hot hand is no different than a casino winning streak in a perfect casino, but the statistician is asking a different question than the non-statistician.
The statistician should be asking how the percentage of streaks varies from day to day; this will more closely operationalize what the non-statistician is observing and make the statistician wealthier as well.
The world of sports is a world of imperfect casinos. This confounds statisticians.
jueves, 18 de octubre de 2012
Yankees' Scoring Drought in ALCS
The Detroit Tigers have now completed a sweep of the New York Yankees in the American League Championship Series to advance to baseball's World Series. Beyond the fact of the Yankees being swept in a playoff series -- the first time this has happened since 1980 -- an additional noteworthy aspect of the ALCS is New York's extreme difficulty scoring runs.
As shown in the table below (for which I consulted the Yankees' game-by-game log), the New Yorkers put zeroes on the scoreboard for 36 of the 39 innings played. (You can click on the graphic to enlarge it.) Another way to look at the situation is that the Yankees scored in only around 8% of the innings of the ALCS.
Over the past few minutes, as I've been writing, the announcers on tonight's Giants-Cardinals National League Championship Series game have been discussing the Yankees' demise. According to these announcers, New York's team batting average against Detroit was a woeful .157.
Of course, the Tigers have excellent pitching, led by Justin Verlander. Therefore, the Yankees' poor offense in the ALCS might be understandable to some extent. An interesting comparison (to me at least) would be to look at how the Yankees did against Detroit in the regular season. Listed below are all the Yankee-Tiger regular-season games this season and the number of innings per game in which New York scored.
April 27 -- 6 of 9 innings
April 28 -- 3 of 9
April 29 -- 4 of 8
June 1 -- 4 of 9
June 2 -- 3 of 9
June 3 -- 3 of 9
August 6 -- 1 of 9
August 7 -- 3 of 9
August 8 -- 6 of 9
August 9 -- 2 of 9
So, in contrast to the ALCS, New York scored fairly readily against Detroit in the regular season. In fact, the Yankees scored in 35 of the 89 total innings (39%) in which they batted against Tiger pitching. Thus, the Yankees did not seem to be at an inherent disadvantage against Detroit pitching in the ALCS. New York just got cold.
As shown in the table below (for which I consulted the Yankees' game-by-game log), the New Yorkers put zeroes on the scoreboard for 36 of the 39 innings played. (You can click on the graphic to enlarge it.) Another way to look at the situation is that the Yankees scored in only around 8% of the innings of the ALCS.
Over the past few minutes, as I've been writing, the announcers on tonight's Giants-Cardinals National League Championship Series game have been discussing the Yankees' demise. According to these announcers, New York's team batting average against Detroit was a woeful .157.
Of course, the Tigers have excellent pitching, led by Justin Verlander. Therefore, the Yankees' poor offense in the ALCS might be understandable to some extent. An interesting comparison (to me at least) would be to look at how the Yankees did against Detroit in the regular season. Listed below are all the Yankee-Tiger regular-season games this season and the number of innings per game in which New York scored.
April 27 -- 6 of 9 innings
April 28 -- 3 of 9
April 29 -- 4 of 8
June 1 -- 4 of 9
June 2 -- 3 of 9
June 3 -- 3 of 9
August 6 -- 1 of 9
August 7 -- 3 of 9
August 8 -- 6 of 9
August 9 -- 2 of 9
So, in contrast to the ALCS, New York scored fairly readily against Detroit in the regular season. In fact, the Yankees scored in 35 of the 89 total innings (39%) in which they batted against Tiger pitching. Thus, the Yankees did not seem to be at an inherent disadvantage against Detroit pitching in the ALCS. New York just got cold.
sábado, 13 de octubre de 2012
Smith's INT-Free Streak Persists, But WVU Crushed
Here's a follow-up to my previous posting on West Virginia quarterback Geno Smith and his streak of not having his passes intercepted. He attempted 55 passes today, none of which was picked off by Texas Tech (29 of his passes were caught and 26 fell incomplete). Smith thus extends his streak to 312 interception-free throws since he was lasted intercepted, vs. South Florida on December 1, 2011. Today was hardly a good day for the Mountaineers, however, as Texas Tech dominated throughout, 49-14.
UPDATE: Smith avoided an interception for his first 13 passes against Kansas State on October 20 (9 complete, 4 incomplete), before finally being picked off by the Wildcats. His streak of interception-free throws thus ended at 325.
UPDATE: Smith avoided an interception for his first 13 passes against Kansas State on October 20 (9 complete, 4 incomplete), before finally being picked off by the Wildcats. His streak of interception-free throws thus ended at 325.
miércoles, 10 de octubre de 2012
West Virginia QB Geno Smith Brings Long Interception-Free Streak to Game at Texas Tech
West Virginia quarterback Geno Smith, whose team plays Saturday here at Texas Tech, has an impressive interception-free streak going. Looking at Smith's player page at ESPN.com, he has played five games this season, attempting 204 passes and completing 166 of them (81.4%), without being picked off a single time.
In Smith's final game of last season, a 70-33 spanking of Clemson in the Orange Bowl, he threw the ball 43 times (completing 32 passes) without an interception. In the game before that, a 30-27 Mountaineer win at South Florida, Smith was picked off twice. Looking at the play-by-play sheet, Smith's final interception came with 9:56 remaining in the fourth quarter, a "pick-six" (interception return for touchdown). Smith rebounded, however, to drive WVU to a touchdown and game-winning field goal. During these two drives, he threw a combined 10 passes, of which 7 were completed. (One West Virginia play was listed as "Team pass incomplete," which may have involved immediately spiking the ball to stop the clock and set up the final field-goal attempt; I'm not including this in Smith's statistics.)
All told, since his last interception, he has attempted 257 passes (204 this season + 43 in the Orange Bowl + 10 at the end of the South Florida game) and completed 205 of them (166 this season + 32 in the Orange Bowl + 7 at the end of the South Florida game).
The NCAA record book for top-tier (Football Bowl Subdivision) programs features this entry:
MOST CONSECUTIVE PASSES ATTEMPTED WITHOUT AN INTERCEPTION
379—Russell Wilson, North Carolina St., 2008-09
Thus, if Smith continues to average around 40 pass attempts per game and doesn't throw any interceptions, he could surpass Wilson in three more games. For Smith's entire collegiate career, he's thrown 15 interceptions in 1,151 passing attempts (a little over 1%). If we assume, accordingly, that each future pass he throws has a .99 probability of not being intercepted, then his probability of throwing another 122 attempts without an interception (to tie Wilson) is .99 to the 122nd power. This yields roughly a .30 chance of Smith tying Wilson.
Some observers may question the value of attempts without an interception, as under this metric a quarterback receives credit for throwing a ball away when no receiver is open. I (and others) have tried to pinpoint the NCAA record for consecutive completions without an interception, without getting final resolution. According to a posting on this West Virginia fan site, Smith is not too far behind some leading figures on consecutive interception-free completions, namely Wilson at 220 and Andre Woodson (Kentucky, 2004-07) at 223. (The fan page lists Smith with 206 straight interception-free completions, a slight discrepancy with my calculation.)
When, if ever, will Smith's collegiate interception-free streak come to an end? Vote in the poll in the right-hand column.
In Smith's final game of last season, a 70-33 spanking of Clemson in the Orange Bowl, he threw the ball 43 times (completing 32 passes) without an interception. In the game before that, a 30-27 Mountaineer win at South Florida, Smith was picked off twice. Looking at the play-by-play sheet, Smith's final interception came with 9:56 remaining in the fourth quarter, a "pick-six" (interception return for touchdown). Smith rebounded, however, to drive WVU to a touchdown and game-winning field goal. During these two drives, he threw a combined 10 passes, of which 7 were completed. (One West Virginia play was listed as "Team pass incomplete," which may have involved immediately spiking the ball to stop the clock and set up the final field-goal attempt; I'm not including this in Smith's statistics.)
All told, since his last interception, he has attempted 257 passes (204 this season + 43 in the Orange Bowl + 10 at the end of the South Florida game) and completed 205 of them (166 this season + 32 in the Orange Bowl + 7 at the end of the South Florida game).
The NCAA record book for top-tier (Football Bowl Subdivision) programs features this entry:
MOST CONSECUTIVE PASSES ATTEMPTED WITHOUT AN INTERCEPTION
379—Russell Wilson, North Carolina St., 2008-09
Thus, if Smith continues to average around 40 pass attempts per game and doesn't throw any interceptions, he could surpass Wilson in three more games. For Smith's entire collegiate career, he's thrown 15 interceptions in 1,151 passing attempts (a little over 1%). If we assume, accordingly, that each future pass he throws has a .99 probability of not being intercepted, then his probability of throwing another 122 attempts without an interception (to tie Wilson) is .99 to the 122nd power. This yields roughly a .30 chance of Smith tying Wilson.
Some observers may question the value of attempts without an interception, as under this metric a quarterback receives credit for throwing a ball away when no receiver is open. I (and others) have tried to pinpoint the NCAA record for consecutive completions without an interception, without getting final resolution. According to a posting on this West Virginia fan site, Smith is not too far behind some leading figures on consecutive interception-free completions, namely Wilson at 220 and Andre Woodson (Kentucky, 2004-07) at 223. (The fan page lists Smith with 206 straight interception-free completions, a slight discrepancy with my calculation.)
When, if ever, will Smith's collegiate interception-free streak come to an end? Vote in the poll in the right-hand column.
jueves, 4 de octubre de 2012
Koji Uehara's 25 Straight Retired Batters
A few nights ago, as the Texas Rangers brought in pitcher Koji Uehara for a late-inning appearance, one of the announcers on the telecast I was watching argued that Uehara was as hot a pitcher as was currently going in Major League Baseball. Naturally, when I hear a claim like that, I have to check it out!
After a few days had gone by, I examined ESPN.com's statistical page for Uehara. I also searched for recent articles, one of which confirmed that before the streak ended (on October 1), Uehara had retired 25 consecutive batters. To put things in perspective, a perfect game involves retiring 27 straight batters (i.e., 3 batters in each of 9 innings).
In honor of Uehara's accomplishment, I have listed the 25 batters that he sat down consecutively (along with the type of out each made) to the right.
As I discuss in my book Hot Hand, then-Chicago White Sox pitcher Mark Buehrle holds the record for consecutive batters retired, at 45. The leaders in this category include starters (such as Buehrle) and relievers such as Bobby Jenks (41). In my book, I asked whether a streak of consecutive batters retired would be easier for a starter or reliever to achieve, citing the following considerations:
"A starter can... build up the streak in fewer games, but must have the stamina to keep pitching at a high level throughout the game. A reliever, on the other hand, may know that he is only going to pitch an inning or two on a given night, which would allow him to concentrate on retiring just a few opposing batters (going “all guns a blazing” with each one). A reliever, though, would have to keep this up for perhaps 20, 30, or more appearances to contend for this record" (p. 93).
I invite readers to share their views on this matter, in the Comments.
After a few days had gone by, I examined ESPN.com's statistical page for Uehara. I also searched for recent articles, one of which confirmed that before the streak ended (on October 1), Uehara had retired 25 consecutive batters. To put things in perspective, a perfect game involves retiring 27 straight batters (i.e., 3 batters in each of 9 innings).
In honor of Uehara's accomplishment, I have listed the 25 batters that he sat down consecutively (along with the type of out each made) to the right.
As I discuss in my book Hot Hand, then-Chicago White Sox pitcher Mark Buehrle holds the record for consecutive batters retired, at 45. The leaders in this category include starters (such as Buehrle) and relievers such as Bobby Jenks (41). In my book, I asked whether a streak of consecutive batters retired would be easier for a starter or reliever to achieve, citing the following considerations:
"A starter can... build up the streak in fewer games, but must have the stamina to keep pitching at a high level throughout the game. A reliever, on the other hand, may know that he is only going to pitch an inning or two on a given night, which would allow him to concentrate on retiring just a few opposing batters (going “all guns a blazing” with each one). A reliever, though, would have to keep this up for perhaps 20, 30, or more appearances to contend for this record" (p. 93).
I invite readers to share their views on this matter, in the Comments.
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